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Introduction 
 
Parental responsibility to a third, outside the family individual, in any situation, 
potentially undermines the completeness of the nuclear family unit.  It is a signal of 
anomaly.  
 
(Dr Claire Sturge quoted by Black J in Re D, para. 61) 
 
This case comment seeks to examine the family form rhetoric in the High Court case 
of Re D (contact and parental responsibility: Lesbian mothers and known father) 
[2006] EWHC 2 (Fam), [2006] 1 FCR 556.  Specifically, the comment seeks to relate 
the concept of the two-parent ‘sexual family’ (Fineman, 1995, pp.143-176), as the 
means of legitimising and organising familial relations, to the decision in Re D.  In Re 
D, the High Court granted a restricted form of parental responsibility to the applicant 
and child’s biological father, Mr B.  The respondents, Ms A and Ms C—a lesbian 
couple who are D’s co-mothers and primary carers—objected to the application.  By 
awarding Mr B a contingent form of parental responsibility, Judge Black felt that he 
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was taking a ‘creative’ approach to parental responsibility that would accommodate 
Mr B’s need to be recognised as D’s father, as well as reflecting the ‘paramount 
position of the family comprising the two mothers and the [child]’ (para. 93).  Re D is 
a notable case for several reasons.  Firstly, it directly situates parental responsibility in 
the context of parental status and recognition, as opposed to its more traditional 
presentation as a practical tool for parenting.  The ‘creative’ use of parental 
responsibility in Re D further reflects the current inadequacy of legal terminology in a 
society where parenthood increasingly occurs outside the confines of the traditional 
nuclear family.  This has contributed to the growing significance of obtaining an 
award of parental responsibility in the absence of any alternative recognition or grant 
of status that may better suit a particular parenting role.  Secondly, while arguably 
affording further and welcomed legal recognition to same-sex parenting and families, 
the judgment in Re D emphasises the limited form of this increased recognition and its 
dependence on a sexually intimate couple as opposed to care and/or dependency 
relations.  Thirdly, in positioning Mr B as a potential threat to the security of the 
primary family unit, we see a shift in legal attitude towards fatherhood, which has 
traditionally been constructed as fomenting family security.  This shift however is 
perhaps of limited applicability, materialising only when the child is already located 
within a sexual family unit.   In Re D, we also see a legal deference to the significance 
and recognition of genetic fatherhood, begging the question, to what extent have 
dominant notions of fatherhood really changed? 
 
 
Background and Legal Issue 
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The history of Re D is that Ms A and Ms C decided they would like to raise a child 
together.  Wanting the child to have a father figure, they advertised for a man who 
would be interested in (physically) fathering a child with them.  Mr B came forward 
and in 2000, D was born after sexual intercourse took place between Ms A and Mr B.  
It is unclear from the case how the parties reached their decision to pursue the 
arrangement, or to what extent they explicitly discussed how parental status and roles 
would be manifest.  However, no formal agreement was made and when D was born 
conflict soon arose when it became clear that there was disparity in relation to the 
envisioned extent of Mr B’s direct involvement with D.  Mr B expected to have much 
more of a parenting role than Ms A and Ms C intended.  Although seeking to 
encourage a direct father-child relationship between Mr B and D, Ms A and Ms C 
wanted this to be through ‘relatively infrequent visits and benign and loving interest’ 
as opposed to ‘something of the role of the absent parent after divorce’ (per Black J at 
para. 5).   
The parties first came to court in 2001 when Mr B applied for contact with D 
and a parental responsibility order under the Children Act 1989.  At this time, there 
was a considerable amount of mistrust and resentment between the two parties.  This 
was attributable to not only their disparate visions, but also Mr B’s excessive and 
often inappropriate reactions to the conflict, such as incessant phone calls, frequent 
accusatory postcards and claims that he would oust Ms C (D’s non-biological mother) 
when he obtained parental responsibility for D.  The presiding judge, Black J, 
indicated that he would not be prepared to award Mr B parental responsibility at this 
stage.  Mr B’s application for parental responsibility was therefore adjourned.  
However, Black J did make provision for limited monthly contact between Mr B and 
D.  While Mr B’s behaviour since D’s birth had not been helpful, Black J was 
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encouraged by his more recent efforts to regain control of his emotions, such as by 
attending counselling.  Black J felt that although it was important that any decision he 
made regarding contact should reflect and foster the security of D’s primary family 
unit with Ms A and Ms C (para. 9), Mr B was still an important figure in D’s life and 
that it would be in D’s best interests to have contact with him (para. 10).  By the time 
Re D reached the court again in 2006, the issue of contact between Mr B and D—
which had been increased over time by agreement between the parties—had been 
reasonably settled.  The legal issue now in polarised dispute was whether Mr B should 
be granted parental responsibility, alongside Ms A and Ms C.  Given D’s current 
living arrangements and Ms A and Ms C’s opposition to Mr B having parental 
responsibility, applying for a parental responsibility order from the court under 
section 4(1)(c) of the Children Act 1989 was the most appropriate course of action for 
Mr B.  Whether or not to award him the order was the legal issue in Re D.   
 
 
Considering Parental Responsibility 
 
Obtaining Parental Responsibility 
It is worth here considering how particular adults obtain parental responsibility, to 
help stress the significance of the concept of the sexual family in the legal regulation 
of families.  While the legislative framework is somewhat flexible (see sections 2(5)-
(7) and 3(5), Children Act 1989)—and certainly more so than that of parentage—it 
still reflects an ideological preference for the (biological and/or legal) sexual family 
by making it more straightforward for those who are within its boundaries to obtain 
parental responsibility.  To demonstrate, women who give birth are automatically 
 5 
granted parental responsibility (section (2)(1) and 2(2)(a), Children Act 1989), as are 
married fathers (section 2(1), Children Act 1989).  As D’s full biological mother, this 
is how Ms A obtained parental responsibility.  Biological fathers, who like Mr B were 
not married to the child’s legal mother at the time of birth, can directly apply for 
parental responsibility and have been able to do so since the Children Act 1989 came 
into force.  They can either make a formal agreement with the child’s mother (section 
4(1)(b), Children Act 1989), or apply for a parental responsibility order or a residence 
order from the court (sections 4(1)(c) and 12(1), Children Act 1989).  While much 
attention has been given to the difference between how married and unmarried fathers 
obtain parental responsibility (see Sheldon 2001), it is important to recognise that only 
biological fathers—as opposed to social parents and carers— have been able to apply 
directly for parental responsibility since the enactment of the Children Act 1989.  In 
addition, since 1 December 2003, if an unmarried biological father jointly registers 
the child’s birth with the mother, he will automatically be granted parental 
responsibility upon registration (section 4(1)(a), Children Act 1989).
1
  Therefore, 
while the Children Act 1989 may have entrenched the ‘naturalness’ of the marital 
family unit, the biological imperatives of the sexual family unit have also been 
afforded special recognition.  Similarly, under recent legislative reforms, step-parents 
and civil partners are now entitled to apply directly for parental responsibility under 
the newly inserted sections 4A and 4A(1) of the Children Act 1989.  Clearly these 
new reforms give welcomed legal recognition to non-biological parents who 
undertake a parenting role with respect to a partner’s ‘natural’ child—but only if they 
have a legally valid partnership with that person.  
 
                                                 
1
 This legislative reform was not retrospective.  Therefore, even if Mr B was named as D’s father on 
her birth certificate (which is not discussed in the case), he still has to take formal action in order to 
obtain parental responsibility. 
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Non-biological parents, who like Ms C do not have a legally recognised 
relationship with a child’s natural parent, have tended to rely on residence orders to 
obtain parental responsibility (see Re G (Children) [2005] EWCA (Civ) 462).  In Re 
D, Ms A and Ms C were awarded a joint residence order (section 12(2), Children Act 
1989) at the conclusion of the 2001 hearing.  Although section 114 of the Adoption 
and Children Act 2002 amends section 12 of the Children Act 1989 to enable the 
court to direct that a residence order made in favour of any person who is not a 
(biological) parent to continue in force until the child reaches 18, how this will affect 
joint residence orders is not yet clear.  Therefore, it may well be that unlike Ms A’s 
permanent award of parental responsibility, Ms C’s current award of parental 
responsibility is dependent upon the joint residence order remaining in force.  If Ms C 
were to become Ms A’s civil partner, and apply directly for parental responsibility, 
her award would remain in force until otherwise directed by the court, as with the 
parental responsibility orders awarded to unmarried biological fathers.  In other 
words, for a parental responsibility award not to be contingent on another award under 
the children Act 1989 being in place, the adult must be within the boundary of the 
sexual family unit, either through a biological connection, or by formalising their 
intimate relationship with a child’s ‘natural’ parent. 
 
The Concept of Parental Responsibility 
Before we discuss the desirability of Mr B being granted the order, it is worth first 
considering the actual concept and purpose of having parental responsibility.  Parental 
responsibility was introduced into statute by the Children Act 1989.  Its introduction 
was intended to signal a shift in emphasis from parental power and rights, to parental 
care (see Lowe and Douglas, 2007, pp. 369-70).  The relationship between parental 
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rights and responsibilities has been addressed in detail by various commentators since 
the Children Act 1989 came into force (see McCall Smith, 1990; Eekelaar, 1991, 
1994; Bainham, 1994).  What is important for the purposes of this comment is to 
appreciate that the introduction of parental responsibility was intended to foster the 
notion that, 
 
…the duty to care for the child and to raise him to moral, physical and emotional 
health is the fundamental task of parenthood and the only justification for the 
authority that it confers. 
 
(Department of Health, Introduction to the Children Act 1989, HMSO: 1989: 
para.1.4) 
 
It would seem to follow then that the function of parental responsibility is to enable 
someone to act as a parent by legally conferring to them the ability to make decisions 
about a child’s care and upbringing.  In other words, vest someone with the legal 
authority to act as a social parent.  However, as the very definition of parental 
responsibility suggests, parental rights and responsibilities remain intertwined terms 
(see further Bainham, 1999, pp.33-35; Lowe and Douglas, 2007, 377-408): 
 
… ‘parental responsibility’ means all the rights, duties, powers, responsibility and 
authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property. 
 
(Section 3(1) of the Children Act 1989) 
 
Practically, we can easily see how rights and responsibilities may be acted on 
simultaneously, particularly in the context of a parent(s) seeking to exercise their care 
of the child without the interference from the state or another parent(s).  However, as 
Lowe and Douglas note, the judiciary have further endorsed the idea that parental 
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responsibility confers not just rights as well as responsibilities, but also a type of 
status (2007, p.375).  Black J made early reference to this in Re D by quoting Butler 
Sloss LJ in his elaboration of the concept from the Children Act 1989 definition: 
 
Parental responsibility is a question of status and is different in concept from the 
orders which may be made under s 8 in Pt II of the Children Act.  The grant of the 
application declares the status of the applicant as the father of that child.  It has the 
important implications for a father whose child might for example be the subject of an 
adoption application or a Hague Convention application.  In each of those examples, 
a father with parental responsibility would have the right to be heard on the 
application.  
 
(Para. 20, quote from Re H (a minor) (parental responsibility) [1998] 2 FCR 89) 
 
Whether or not we agree that parental responsibility should (or does) confer a type of 
status, what is clear is that the status is contingent upon being able to exercise certain 
‘rights’.  Re D then is particularly noteworthy, given that Mr B was granted (at his 
own suggestion) an award of parental responsibility that prescribed how and when he 
could exercise his parental ‘rights’ in relation to D’s education and medical treatment.  
These are two significant areas of a child’s upbringing, and parental responsibility is 
needed if an adult is to be entitled to make related decisions or be consulted (see 
section 2(7), Children Act 1989).  Having parental status through legal parentage does 
not create similar entitlements.  We can therefore appreciate the significance of an 
award of parental responsibility for someone who wants their parental status to mean 
more (even if not day-to-day care) than having their name on a birth certificate, or 
having a certain status with respect to succession law.  An award of parental 
responsibility is of even more significance when that person’s parental role is in 
dispute, or where parental relationships are likely to break down (see para. 48). 
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However, under the award granted in Re D, Mr B could not visit or contact D’s school 
without the prior written consent of Ms A or Ms C, nor contact any health 
professional involved in D’s medical care without similar consent.  Given that D’s 
schooling and medical care were two of the main areas of conflict between the parties, 
we are left questioning the tangible effects of granting him this particular parental 
responsibility order.  While his award evidently creates other ‘rights’ beyond the 
medical and education context (see Bainham, 1999, 33-35), most of these were not in 
dispute.
2
  Re D therefore, is perhaps the first case to really locate parental 
responsibility in the context of pure status, given that his award was effectively 
‘stripped of practical effect’ (per Black J, para. 21).  This leaves us questioning 
whether or not Mr B should really have been granted the award given the fundamental 
nature of the pre-conditions, or why Black J did not instead regulate the award 
through a ‘prohibited steps’ or ‘specific issue’ order (section 8, Children Act 1989)?  
 
The Decision: Awarding Parental Responsibility Orders 
Traditionally, the decision whether or not to award a parental responsibility order has 
been based on a consideration of the unmarried biological father’s ‘commitment’, 
‘attachment’ and ‘motivation’ (see Re H (minors) (rights of putative fathers) (No 2) 
[1991] FCR 361; sub nom Re H (minors) (local authority: parental rights) [1991] 2 
All ER 185), guided by whether or not the order is in the child’s best interests (section 
1, Children Act 1989).  Perhaps because of the amorphous nature of the best interest 
principle, the courts have concentrated heavily on these three material considerations 
(per Black J, para. 25), and a parental responsibility order tends to be awarded where 
the biological father has some sort of ‘positive relationship’ with the child (see further 
                                                 
2
 Note that the ability to consent/object to an adoption was another significant ‘right’ considered by 
Black J (paras. 21 and 94).  This issue shall be addressed in the discussion section. 
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Sheldon, 2001, p.103).  Given the various precedents, the Child and Family Court 
Advisory Support Service (CAFCASS) officer recommended that this was a case 
where the biological father should be granted parental responsibility, 
 
Mr B clearly has a positive relationship with the child, he has demonstrated 
commitment and given the length of time of his involvement, he is not a threat to Ms 
A and Ms C’s relationship. 
 
(para. 26) 
 
However, Black J took the view that this was not a sophisticated enough analysis of 
the situation and the ‘novel’ issues it presented.  Black J, instead ordered that expert 
evidence should be obtained, and a consultant child and adolescent psychiatrist, Dr 
Claire Sturge, was asked, 
 
…to consider the sociological and psychological impact (both in the short and long 
term) of granting the father parental responsibility (i) on the child (ii) on the primary 
family unit and (iii) on society’s perception of the family. 
 
(para. 28) 
 
While Black J acknowledged the increased legal recognition of same-sex families in 
his ruling (para. 30-32), he was receptive to the anxieties held by Ms A and Ms C 
about the extent to which society would recognise and accept their ‘family’, 
particularly the role of Ms C as D’s (non-biological) co-mother (para. 33 and 64).  
Although there is not space in this short comment to discuss the psychiatrist’s report 
in full, it is worth noting that in the absence of any conclusive research as to whether 
awarding Mr B parental responsibility would or would not be in D’s best interests 
with respect to her development and identity formation (para. 70-74), Dr Sturge 
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instead focussed her report on whether awarding Mr B parental responsibility would 
affect the security and integrity of D’s primary (sexual) family unit with Ms A and Ms 
C.  Dr Struge did not make a specific recommendation, but did voice her opinion in 
evidence that ‘the risks of Mr B having parental responsibility outweighed the 
benefits’ (para. 84), and that Mr B’s practical commitment to D would be unaffected 
by parental responsibility (para. 71).  Black J provided in his judgement a string of 
quotes from Dr Sturge’s report that reflect her concerns that awarding Mr B parental 
responsibility would cause tension with D’s primary (sexual) family unit, and ‘signal 
anomaly’ to both D and society at large.  These are worth quoting in full to help 
demonstrate how family form became the integral consideration of D’s best interests 
in the case, rather than substantive parenting, which instead received nominal 
attention: 
 
The more her father is in evidence, the less clear D will be about what constitutes her 
family and how viable the unit within which she lives is. 
 
The more her father is around, the more likely that others will treat the “central” 
family as incomplete and seek to include the father e.g. in school decisions and 
medical treatment. 
 
A third parent (and I use the word advisedly) will be confusing for D.  Her sense of 
security will be strongest if she is clear that responsibility for her lies within her 
“nuclear” family. 
 
(para. 81) 
  
Despite these concerns however, Dr Sturge (like Black J) is sympathetic to Mr B’s 
need to have an officially recognised role in D’s life, 
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What would solve this would be if the father could receive official recognition in 
some way but not be allowed to involve himself in the nitty gritty of D’s life-the 
parenting couple having rights above his in this area as is, for example, seen in 
special guardianship. 
 
(para. 83) 
 
Similarly, the CAFCASS officer (who thought it in D’s best interests to award the 
order) saw the application as being more about meeting Mr B’s emotional need to be 
recognised as D’s parent, than affecting the current practicalities of his relationship 
and contact with D (para. 85).  Indeed, he suggested that an award of parental 
responsibility might, in meeting his need to be recognised, encourage less day-to-day 
interference from Mr B.  This again reflects the irony of the award in Re D—that Mr 
B should be granted an order that has traditionally been seen as a practical tool for 
parenting, to enable him to take a step back from D’s daily care.  While Black J may 
regard his decision as a ‘creative’ approach to parental responsibility, we do have to 
consider what kind of precedent he has created.  To what extent has he shifted the 
boundaries and purpose of an award of parental responsibility?  Alternatively, given 
the fine-balance of the award being, or not being in D’s best interests, we also have to 
wonder why Black J thought it better to award an order ‘stripped of practical effect’ as 
opposed to deciding that a non-contingent award should be granted, or that the 
application should be denied? 
 
 
Concluding Discussion 
 
Considering Alternative Decisions 
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A useful way of analysing the decision in Re D may be to consider what the judge 
could have otherwise decided.  As aforementioned, Black J could have either 1) 
granted the order without the preconditions, 2) granted the order without the 
preconditions, but have attached a section 8 order to it, or 3) denied the application.  
While the second option may effectively seem the same as the actual decision, there 
are subtle but important differences.  Granting a contingent order inherently changes 
the boundaries of the award, and as Black J said in his conclusion, ‘reflect[s] the 
fundamental nature of these restrictions on Mr B’s parental responsibility’ (para. 91).  
If Mr B fails to meet the conditions, the whole question of whether or not he should 
have parental responsibility would likely have to be reconsidered by the court.  
Similarly, should circumstances change with respect to D’s education and medical 
treatment, an entirely new order not premised on the original contingencies would  
have to be applied for.  Alternatively, regulating the award with a section 8 order 
indicates that as a father with a ‘positive relationship’ with his biological child, Mr B 
is entitled to the ‘rights’ emerging from parental responsibility, but that particular 
circumstances—in this case, his past behaviour and his relationship with D’s primary 
carers—have resulted in the court ordered restrictions being necessary to ensure D’s 
best interests.  If circumstances were to change, the restrictions could then be 
amended or removed.  Such a decision may have better reflected the legal precedents 
relating to parental responsibility orders and have encouraged the case to be more 
about D’s welfare than the needs of the adults involved and family form.  A 
consideration of why granting the order without any regulation, or denying the order, 
may not have been viable alternatives, will elaborate such a claim. 
 
Dismissing the Application and Legal Terminology 
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There are few cases whereby a parental responsibility order has been refused, 
indicative of the reality that few men without some sort of ‘positive relationship’ with 
their child apply for one (Sheldon, 2001, p.103).  Although Mr B has been referred to 
occasionally as a ‘(known) sperm donor’ (para. 53), this hardly adequately reflects the 
situation now.  Under current precedents then—as referred to by the CAFCASS 
officer—we can appreciate why Black J did not simply dismiss the application when 
Re D reached the courts again in 2006.  Furthermore, we should perhaps not 
underestimate the reality that unlike most resident parents, parental responsibility is 
often sought by a non-resident parent not to enable that adult to undertake the day-to-
day care of the child, but to give them certain entitlements that legal parentage does 
not currently convey.  While Re D focussed particularly on schooling and medical 
care in this context, another pertinent entitlement referred to, was the fact that if Mr B 
did not have parental responsibility, his consent to an adoption application would not 
have to be obtained (para. 94).  While the Adoption and Children Act 2002 allows a 
same-sex partner to adopt a partner’s biological child without severing the partner’s 
parentage (section 51(2)), the parentage of the child’s other biological parent (if 
known) will be disengaged.  Therefore, if Ms C applied to adopt D in the future, and 
Mr B did not have parental responsibility, he would legally not have to be notified, 
nor his consent obtained.  Black J felt that this would have been inappropriate given 
the level of commitment that Mr B had shown to D (para. 94), the lack of formal 
agreement before D was born compounding the need for a sensitive consideration of 
these issues.   
 The difficulties surrounding the adoption issue similarly reflect the inadequacy 
of legal concepts and terminology in the context of parenthood and increasingly 
disparate families.  These shortcomings were acknowledged in Re D by both Black J 
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and Dr. Sturge (see paras. 22, 33-34, 57).  However, the end decision in the case fails 
to substantially reflect these concerns and instead indicates that an award of parental 
responsibility should be tailored to meet ‘novel’ parenting situations, whether or not 
this award offends the originally intended purpose of parental responsibility.  While 
reforms such as section 51(2) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and proposed 
amendments to the parentage provisions in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990 (see Department of Health, 2006, para. 2.69) are clearly important and 
welcome, they merely scratch the surface of a much-needed review of legal categories 
related to parenthood and families.  For instance, legal parentage could be 
reconsidered in a much more substantial way than permitting two people of the same 
sex to hold the status.  Recently, Ontario’s Court of Appeal allowed a child to have 
three legally recognised parents in the context of a similar situation to Re D (A.A. v 
B.B., 2007 ONCA 2).  A reform such as this would have removed the precarious need 
for Ms C to have to adopt D in the first place, and have kept this aspect of parental 
recognition a parentage as opposed to a parental responsibility issue.  Similarly, 
rethinking both what parentage is grounded on and what it is to mean in practical 
terms could be a useful endeavour, encouraging the legal terminology in this area to 
better reflect empirical reality and stop cases like Re D becoming so ‘zero-sum’. 
 
Awarding a Non-Contingent Award and the Sexual Family 
What then of Black J’s decision not to award a non-contingent parental responsibility 
order?  Ultimately, this reflects the extent to which the concept of the sexual family 
orders legal considerations of familial relations.  Black J distinguished Re D from the 
previous case-law, which dealt mainly with granting parental responsibility  in the 
context of the child being raised solely by its mother, as opposed to a pre-formed 
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sexual family.  Granting parental responsibility to Mr B then would effectively 
acknowledge the existence of the ‘anomalous’ parent-number-three.  While not 
wishing to deride the fears Ms A and Ms C had regarding the difficulties they will 
face in gaining acceptance of their family unit, the discussion in the case does stand 
testament to the assumption that a child should have two parents.  In other words, that 
Black J felt the need to so distinguish the case, as opposed to presenting his concerns 
in the context of D’s best interests because of, say the tense relationships between the 
parties, reveals the underlying significance of the sexual family concept; that numbers 
rather than substantive parenting is what is seen to promote the best interests of the 
child.  Would Black J have been as reserved about awarding the parental 
responsibility order in 2006 had it been a single woman (heterosexual or lesbian) who 
had come to this arrangement with Mr B?  If Mr B had behaved in the same fashion 
with a single mother, would this have been discussed in the context of threatening the 
security of the child’s ‘primary family unit’, or would a non-fettered parental 
responsibility order have been assumed to be in the child’s best interests, under the 
mantra of ‘two-is-better-than-one’?  Although these questions are clearly speculative, 
it is useful to think through them and to reflect on the fact that the ‘security’ of a 
similarly derided family unit—that of the single parent—would likely have received 
trifling attention.  The worrisome numbers of contact orders being granted to a violent 
ex-partner of a resident parent perhaps indicative of this assertion (see Eriksson and 
Hester, 2001; Smart and Neale, 1999, chapter 8).   
 
The Significance of Genetic Fatherhood 
A final issue of significance is how Re D relates to dominant socio-legal notions of 
fatherhood.  Firstly, it is interesting that Mr B should be posited as a potential threat to 
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familial security.  This compares greatly to the socio-legal rhetoric that from the mid-
1980s has traditionally constructed fathers as cementing family security. Various 
pieces of legislation have been enacted to reflect this idea by encouraging the 
designation of a ‘father’ to a family unit (see Child Support Act 1991; Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act sections 13(5) and 28; Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act 2003).  Evidence of this supposition can still be 
seen in recent case law, such as Judge Hedley’s ruling in Re R (Contact: Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act) [2001] 1 FLR 247 where he awarded parentage to 
a man (B) who had no biological connection to the child, and no relationship with the 
child’s mother when she undertook the course of fertility treatment that resulted in the 
child’s conception (overturned in Re R (A Child) [2003] EWCA Civ 182 and In Re D 
(A Child Appearing by Her Guardian Ad Litem) (Respondent) [2005] UKHL 33).  
The mother in this case, Ms D, had not told the fertility clinic doctor about the end of 
her relationship with B, and as Sheldon writes,  
 
Speculatively, it would appear that the granting of rights to Mr B might thus be seen 
as a way of imposing appropriate and responsible (male) control over her, the need 
for such control being further mandated by her mental and emotional fragility. 
 
(Sheldon, 2005, p.357) 
 
Interestingly, Hedge J was not convinced of the permanency of Ms D’s relationship 
with her new partner, Mr S.  In other words, he was viewing Ms D and her child as 
being a single-parent family unit, as opposed to a sexual family unit.  Therefore, in 
drawing attention to this possible shift in legal rhetoric on fatherhood, we must not 
loose sight of the fact that it may well be of a very limited nature, materialising only 
when the child is already located within a stable sexual family. 
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 Secondly, the shift may also be limited in that it is coloured by a growing 
emphasis on biological (genetic) fatherhood.  While it should ideally be the private 
prerogative of individuals to order their own familial affairs, it is interesting that Ms A 
and Ms C wanted the ‘father figure’ in D’s life to be biologically related, particularly 
if they wanted the man to have more of an uncle-like as opposed to parental 
relationship.  It may well have been that (non) access to formally regulated donor 
insemination under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, whereby 
sperm donors waive their parentage (section 28(6)), was the deciding practical factor 
(see Millns, 1995).  However, that D’s conception came about through sexual 
intercourse as opposed to self-insemination indicates that on some level, the 
biological connection was important for Ms A and Ms C, perhaps representing a level 
of permanency that a social ‘father figure’ might not?  Given the legal 
acknowledgment of biological fatherhood, such a belief could certainly be 
understood.  It also reflects the many interconnected, and sometimes contradictory 
notions that we have of parenthood, in the context of whether it is the biological, legal 
or social ties that matter.  Furthermore, that Black J did not simply accept the expert 
evidence of Dr Sturge—in that the award would unduly put at risk the security of D’s 
primary (sexual) family unit—indicates a similar legal attachment to biological 
fatherhood and the belief that it should be afforded legal recognition.  While 
understanding Black J’s concerns about the adoption issue and precedent, his award 
simultaneously represents a prioritising of Mr B’s biological parentage over that of 
Ms C potential legal parentage.  Again, as aforementioned, Black J was acting in the 
context of inadequate legal terminology.  However, his end decision and references to 
D’s ‘mother and her mother’s [partner]’ (para. 9 and 10), as opposed to D’s ‘mothers’, 
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does reveal an underlying bias towards biological parenthood and a somewhat 
reluctance to see a social parent as a ‘real’ parent. 
 
Julie McCandless 
Keele University 
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